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It’s	  hardly	  a	  secret	  that	  the	  intelligentsia	  long	  ago	  declared	  religion	  to	  be	  absurd,	  outdated	  and	  
dangerous.	  The	  right-­‐thinking	  smart	  thinkers	  have	  known	  for	  generations	  that	  belief	  in	  god	  is	  a	  
delusion,	  and	  that	  any	  belief	  systems	  which	  contain	  within	  them	  a	  commitment	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  
deity	  are,	  for	  this	  sheer	  fact	  alone,	  poisonous.1	  What	  the	  New	  Atheists	  brought	  to	  the	  table	  was	  an	  
agitation	  at	  the	  apparent	  fact	  of	  religious	  resurgence.	  The	  religious	  voice,	  especially	  the	  Muslim	  
voice	  within	  the	  West,	  has	  indeed	  got	  noisier.	  But	  the	  number	  of	  those	  confessing	  to	  theism	  has	  not	  
grown	  dramatically.2	  Any	  glance	  at	  the	  latest	  array	  of	  literature	  on	  religion	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  
would	  have	  us	  believe	  that	  we	  are	  hopelessly	  imprisoned	  by	  the	  homophobic,	  woman-­‐hating,	  
tyrannical	  chains	  of	  theocracy	  at	  every	  turn.	  In	  reality,	  religious	  belief	  remains	  overwhelmingly	  on	  
the	  decline.3	  As	  a	  secular	  humanist,	  I	  happen	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  proposition	  ‘There	  exists	  a	  god’	  is	  
false.	  But	  I	  think	  it	  is	  perfectly	  rational	  and	  plausible	  to	  hold	  the	  converse	  view.	  I	  do	  not	  think	  that	  
the	  evidence	  is	  neutral	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  there	  exists	  a	  god,	  but	  I	  do	  think	  that	  the	  question	  
isn’t	  so	  obviously	  decided	  in	  advance	  of	  serious	  argument	  and	  careful	  consideration	  of	  the	  evidence.	  
In	  this	  essay	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  current	  debate	  between	  New	  Atheism	  and	  religious	  believers	  is	  
misguided,	  since	  that	  debate	  fails	  to	  capture	  all	  of	  the	  functions	  and	  uses	  of	  meaningful	  religious	  
language.	  The	  debate	  presupposes	  that	  religious	  language	  is	  used	  to	  express	  truth-­‐apt	  claims	  –	  that	  
is,	  claims	  that	  are	  either	  true	  or	  false	  (and	  not	  neither	  or	  both)	  –	  which	  purport	  to	  describe	  states	  of	  
affairs.	  According	  to	  this	  view	  –	  I’ll	  call	  it	  ‘the	  truth-­‐aptness-­‐only’	  or	  ‘TAO’	  view	  –	  religious	  claims	  are	  
exhaustively	  truth-­‐evaluable	  assertions.	  We	  can	  draw	  an	  analogy	  here	  with	  the	  claims	  put	  forward	  
by	  scientists	  or	  historians.	  For	  example,	  when	  a	  chemist	  says	  ‘Water	  is	  H2O’,	  they	  are	  putting	  
forward	  a	  factual	  claim	  which	  purports	  to	  describe	  the	  way	  the	  world	  is.	  The	  claim	  ‘Water	  is	  H2O’	  is	  
true	  if	  and	  only	  if	  water	  really	  is	  H2O;	  the	  claim	  ‘Water	  is	  H2O’	  is	  false	  just	  in	  case	  water	  isn’t	  H2O.	  
Likewise,	  when	  a	  historian	  utters	  the	  sentence,	  ‘Queen	  Victoria	  died	  in	  1901’,	  she	  is	  making	  a	  factual	  
statement	  which	  is	  rendered	  true	  or	  false	  in	  virtue	  of	  whether	  it	  corresponds	  with	  the	  way	  the	  world	  
is.	  (I	  should	  note	  that	  throughout	  this	  article	  I’m	  assuming	  that	  what	  philosophers	  broadly	  call	  ‘the	  
correspondence	  theory	  of	  truth’	  is	  correct.	  There	  are	  other	  theories,	  but	  they	  are	  less	  prominent,	  
and	  I	  think	  the	  correspondence	  theory	  is	  the	  most	  intuitively	  plausible.4	  Moreover,	  even	  if	  any	  rival	  
theory	  of	  truth	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  correct,	  I	  cannot	  see	  how	  that	  undermines	  anything	  I	  say	  in	  this	  
essay.)	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  TAO	  view	  is	  false.	  Making	  truth-­‐apt	  claims	  does	  not	  exhaust	  the	  functions	  
that	  can	  be	  performed	  by	  meaningful	  religious	  language.	  And	  this	  is	  what	  New	  Atheism	  fails	  to	  
recognise.	  
	  
Mind	  your	  language:	  The	  ‘New	  Atheists’	  are	  dogmatists	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  As	  evidence	  of	  this	  trend,	  one	  need	  look	  no	  further	  than	  the	  subtitle	  of	  C.	  Hitchens	  god	  Is	  Not	  Great:	  How	  
Religion	  Poisons	  Everything	  (Atlantic	  Books,	  2007).	  Hitchens	  is	  one	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘Four	  Horsemen’	  of	  New	  
Atheism	  	  
2	  A.	  Copson	  ‘Religious	  Revival	  and	  the	  Failure	  of	  Politics’	  from	  http://andrewcopson.net/2012/05/religious-­‐
revival-­‐and-­‐the-­‐failure-­‐of-­‐politics/	  	  	  
3	  P.	  Harrow	  from	  ‘Integrated	  Household	  Survey	  gives	  misleading	  figures	  on	  religious	  belief’	  (24/09/2010),	  	  from	  
https://humanism.org.uk/2010/09/24/news-­‐661/	   	  
4	  Here	  I	  simply	  mean	  that	  most	  philosophers	  are	  committed	  to	  truth	  entailing	  some	  correspondence	  between	  
the	  proposition	  and	  the	  content	  that	  proposition	  expresses.	  So	  on	  my	  understanding	  most	  philosophers	  who	  
subscribe	  to	  a	  deflationist	  theory	  of	  truth	  are,	  provided	  they	  accept	  this	  correspondence	  intuition,	  adherents	  
of	  the	  correspondence	  theory	  of	  truth.	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It	  is	  true	  that	  some	  uses	  of	  religious	  language,	  and	  perhaps	  the	  vast	  majority,	  are	  descriptive	  truth-­‐
apt	  claims.	  Nonetheless,	  religious	  language	  can	  perform	  other	  roles	  besides	  the	  attempt	  to	  describe	  
the	  way	  the	  world	  is	  in	  the	  factual,	  truth-­‐apt	  sense	  I’ve	  outlined.	  I	  outline	  three	  distinct	  further	  uses	  
of	  religious	  language	  that	  are	  excluded	  by	  the	  TAO	  view.	  First,	  religious	  language	  can	  be	  used	  
poetically.	  Second,	  religious	  language	  can	  be	  used	  to	  express	  an	  aesthetic	  commitment.	  And	  third,	  
religious	  language	  can	  be	  used	  to	  express	  a	  moral	  commitment.	  I	  am	  not	  necessarily	  committed	  to	  
the	  view	  that	  these	  are	  the	  only	  further	  uses	  that	  religious	  language	  can	  perform.	  That	  said,	  I	  do	  
think	  that	  these	  are	  three	  rather	  uncontroversial	  ways	  in	  which	  religious	  language	  is	  used	  –	  without	  
somehow	  becoming	  mysterious	  or	  unintelligible	  nonsense	  –	  that	  are	  not	  paid	  sufficient	  attention	  to	  
by	  the	  New	  Atheists	  (and,	  alas,	  by	  many	  intelligent	  religious	  believers).	  	  
I	  will	  now	  flesh	  out	  how	  religious	  language	  can	  be	  used	  for	  the	  three	  functions	  I	  have	  just	  outlined.	  
Firstly,	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  religious	  language	  can	  be	  used	  poetically.	  By	  this	  I	  mean	  to	  say	  that	  
religious	  stories	  can	  function	  as	  metaphors	  from	  which	  valuable	  instruction	  can	  be	  derived.	  Let	  us	  
take	  the	  example	  of	  the	  Parable	  of	  the	  Good	  Samaritan:	  a	  well-­‐worn	  example,	  I	  concede.	  Many	  
Christians	  seem	  fairly	  comfortable	  in	  stating	  that	  they	  do	  not	  literally	  believe	  that	  the	  Parable	  of	  the	  
Good	  Samaritan	  took	  place.	  Now,	  if	  religious	  claims	  really	  were	  solely	  factual	  truth-­‐apt	  claims,	  this	  
would	  present	  a	  problem	  for	  the	  supposed	  truth	  or	  internal	  coherence	  of	  Christianity.	  Christianity	  
would	  either	  be	  committed	  to	  a	  falsehood,	  or	  else	  it	  would	  be	  preaching	  that	  an	  event	  took	  place	  
which	  nonetheless	  many	  of	  the	  religion’s	  adherents	  do	  not	  believe	  happened.	  Thankfully,	  if	  we	  give	  
up	  the	  TAO	  view,	  we	  are	  able	  to	  make	  far	  better	  sense	  of	  how	  talk	  of	  the	  Good	  Samaritan	  can	  be	  
meaningful	  even	  if	  few	  people	  believe	  that	  the	  events	  captured	  in	  that	  Parable	  ever	  took	  place.	  We	  
simply	  need	  to	  conceive	  of	  the	  events	  described	  by	  the	  Parable	  as	  tokenistic	  of	  a	  broader	  
phenomenon:	  that	  of	  strangers	  helping	  the	  needy.	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  can	  see	  the	  Parable	  of	  the	  
Good	  Samaritan	  as	  a	  metaphorical	  representation	  of	  a	  phenomenon	  with	  which	  we	  are	  confronted	  
in	  our	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  lives.	  There	  are	  two	  important	  comments	  to	  make	  here.	  First,	  I	  think	  that	  the	  
poetic	  interpretation	  of	  religious	  language	  makes	  far	  better	  sense	  of	  the	  Parable	  than	  the	  TAO	  view.5	  
And	  second,	  the	  poetic	  interpretation	  coheres	  with	  our	  ordinary	  practice	  of	  seeing	  the	  Bible	  as	  a	  
source	  of	  everyday	  relevance,	  such	  that	  the	  historical	  truth	  of	  the	  events	  described	  in	  Biblical	  
passages	  are	  no	  longer	  what	  is	  important.	  Rather,	  attention	  shifts	  to	  the	  deeper	  truth	  that	  the	  
stories	  convey.	  These	  are	  truths	  that	  are	  not	  restricted	  to	  the	  spatiotemporal	  context	  of	  the	  precise	  
event	  narrated	  in	  the	  Bible,	  and	  the	  rather	  pedantic	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  such	  an	  event	  or	  
sequence	  of	  events	  really	  took	  place	  as	  scripturally	  documented.6	  	  
I	  also	  have	  two	  other	  functions	  performed	  by	  religious	  language	  in	  mind:	  what	  I	  term	  the	  ‘moral’	  and	  
the	  ‘aesthetic’	  functions.	  Arguably	  these	  can	  each	  be	  said	  to	  constitute	  proper	  subsets	  of	  the	  
metaphorical	  use	  of	  language,	  but	  I	  think	  that	  each	  of	  them	  is	  sufficiently	  interesting	  to	  warrant	  
discussion	  in	  their	  own	  right.	  They	  both	  share	  the	  insight	  that	  religious	  language	  need	  not	  always	  be	  
in	  the	  business	  of	  making	  descriptive	  truth-­‐apt	  claims.	  Instead,	  religious	  language	  can	  and	  often	  does	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  After	  all,	  the	  TAO	  seems	  to	  cohere	  more	  naturally	  with	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  those	  who	  believe	  in	  the	  Good	  
Samaritan’s	  moral	  message	  without	  subscribing	  to	  its	  historical	  accuracy.	  	  
6	  It	  might	  be	  objected	  here	  that	  accepting	  the	  poetic	  function	  of	  religious	  language	  entails	  non-­‐realism	  about	  
God	  (and	  that	  non-­‐realism	  is	  a	  route	  most	  traditional	  believers	  don’t	  want	  to	  follow).	  But	  this	  is	  not	  a	  
necessary	  logical	  entailment,	  and	  for	  that	  matter	  it	  is	  perfectly	  tenable	  to	  subscribe	  to	  both	  the	  poetic	  function	  
of	  religious	  language	  and	  realism	  about	  God.	  See,	  for	  example,	  R.	  Aslan	  No	  god	  but	  God	  (Random	  House,	  2006)	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serve	  a	  performative	  function:	  it	  is	  used	  to	  achieve	  some	  particular	  goal.7	  Philosopher	  J.L.	  Austin	  
thought	  that	  religious	  language	  can	  give	  rise	  to	  speech-­‐acts,	  by	  which	  he	  just	  meant	  that	  instantiated	  
uses	  of	  some	  particular	  string	  of	  religious	  language	  can	  perform	  social	  acts	  and	  rituals.8	  Therefore,	  
rather	  than	  the	  New	  Atheist’s	  presumption	  that	  religious	  claims	  describe	  states	  of	  affairs,	  we	  can	  
instead	  take	  the	  view	  that	  religious	  assertions	  might	  bring	  states	  of	  affairs	  into	  existence.	  
With	  this	  speech-­‐act-­‐oriented	  backdrop	  from	  the	  philosophy	  of	  language,	  we	  can	  now	  make	  good	  
sense	  of	  the	  thought	  that	  religious	  language	  isn’t	  cognitive	  –	  it	  doesn’t	  express	  beliefs	  about	  
propositions	  that	  are	  assessable	  as	  true	  or	  false	  –	  but	  instead	  it	  can	  be	  moral	  or	  aesthetic.	  Religious	  
language	  can	  express	  an	  aesthetic	  commitment	  insofar	  as	  it	  can	  convey	  the	  attempt	  to	  animate	  the	  
universe	  with	  enchantment,	  a	  second	  realm	  of	  reality,	  or,	  less	  fancifully,	  with	  purpose	  or	  overarching	  
intention.	  Equally,	  religious	  language	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  way	  to	  voice	  moral	  seriousness	  and	  
accountability.	  Religious	  language	  is	  rich	  with	  vocabulary	  that	  hints	  at	  an	  objective	  basis	  for	  moral	  
relations:	  words	  like	  ‘sin’,	  ‘redemption’,	  ‘transgression’,	  ‘wrong’	  and	  ‘right’	  all	  gesture	  towards	  there	  
being	  a	  fact	  of	  the	  matter	  as	  to	  what	  actions	  are	  good	  and	  bad,	  and	  therefore	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  
robust	  moral	  values	  that	  we	  can	  talk	  about	  without	  	  blushing.9	  	  
The	  truth	  wars	  go	  ideological	  
Dawkins	  never	  ceases	  to	  avow	  that	  he	  is	  not	  interested	  in	  whether	  beliefs	  are	  comforting,	  or	  morally	  
beneficial,	  or	  whatever	  else.	  Instead,	  all	  he	  cares	  about	  is	  whether	  any	  given	  belief	  is	  true.	  I	  leave	  
aside	  here	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  factors	  other	  than	  a	  belief’s	  being	  true	  might	  provide	  reason	  for	  
us	  to	  cherish	  that	  belief.10	  What	  I	  wish	  to	  emphasise	  is	  the	  fundamental	  irony	  at	  the	  core	  of	  Dawkins’	  
commitment	  to	  the	  search	  for	  truth.	  Much	  ink	  has	  been	  spilt	  on	  exposing	  Dawkins	  as	  being	  
inconsistent,	  since	  if	  he	  is	  truly	  committed	  to	  proportioning	  one’s	  belief	  to	  the	  evidence	  then	  he	  
should	  be	  avowedly	  agnostic.	  But	  I	  think	  there	  is	  a	  much	  deeper,	  though	  less	  examined,	  irony.	  And	  
this	  is	  that	  Dawkins	  fails	  to	  realise	  that	  a	  belief	  can	  be	  at	  one	  and	  the	  same	  time	  be	  both	  literally	  
false	  and	  ideologically	  true.	  I	  will	  now	  explain	  what	  I	  mean	  by	  this	  conjunction,	  and	  precisely	  explain	  
what	  I	  mean	  by	  the	  ‘ideological	  truth’	  of	  any	  belief.	  
Let’s	  take	  as	  our	  example	  the	  belief,	  held	  by	  some	  beliefs	  in	  Christianity	  and	  Islam,	  that	  the	  Earth	  
came	  into	  existence	  only	  4,000	  years	  ago	  (or	  thereabouts).	  If	  this	  claim	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  a	  historical	  
proposition,	  it	  is	  straightforwardly	  false.	  We	  know	  from	  the	  evidence	  of	  history	  and	  archaeology	  that	  
there	  were	  humans	  long	  before	  4,000	  years	  ago.	  What’s	  more,	  we	  know	  from	  the	  fossil	  record	  that	  
life	  has	  existed	  on	  Earth	  for	  millions	  of	  years.	  So	  the	  belief	  in	  Young	  Earth	  Creationism	  is	  literally	  
false.	  But	  even	  where	  religion	  might	  not	  be	  literally	  true,	  religious	  belief	  can	  still	  carry	  useful	  and	  
insightful	  truths.	  It	  can	  carry	  ideological	  truths.	  For	  my	  purposes	  in	  this	  essay,	  I	  take	  an	  ‘ideological	  
truth’	  to	  be	  a	  truth	  that	  is	  symbolically	  conveyed	  or	  expressed	  by	  a	  religious	  belief,	  even	  where	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  J.	  Searle	  ‘Classification	  of	  Illocutionary	  Acts’	  from	  Language	  in	  Society,	  Vol.	  5,	  No.	  1	  (Apr.,	  1976),	  pp.	  3-­‐4	  
8	  J.L.	  Austin	  How	  To	  Do	  Things	  With	  Words	  (Harvard	  University	  Press,	  Mass.,	  Cambridge;	  1976),	  p.	  5	  
9	  I	  draw	  an	  analogy	  here	  between	  the	  apparent	  weighty	  talk	  of	  moral	  objectivity	  we	  find	  in,	  for	  example,	  
Abrahamic	  religions,	  and	  the	  similarly	  weighty	  talk	  of	  the	  robustness	  of	  truth	  found	  in	  S.	  Blackburn	  Truth:	  A	  
Guide	  for	  the	  Perplexed	  (Penguin	  Books,	  2008)	  
10	  Briefly:	  I	  think	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  belief	  is	  beneficial	  in	  motivating	  us	  to	  effective	  action	  and	  consequently	  
pursue	  a	  goal	  provides	  sufficient,	  though	  not	  necessary,	  justification	  for	  holding	  that	  belief.	  So	  it	  is	  sufficient	  
for	  an	  agent	  A	  to	  be	  justified	  in	  believing	  that	  p	  that	  belief	  in	  p	  motivates	  meaningful	  or	  morally	  valuable	  
action.	  But	  it	  isn’t	  necessary	  that	  this	  condition	  be	  met	  for	  A	  to	  be	  justified	  in	  believing	  that	  p.	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religious	  belief	  isn’t	  literally	  true.	  So	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Young	  Earth	  Creationism,	  the	  literal	  truth-­‐status	  of	  
the	  belief	  is	  a	  big	  ‘F’	  for	  False.	  But	  it	  is	  not	  so	  easy	  to	  dismiss	  Young	  Earth	  Creationism’s	  ideological	  
truth-­‐status.	  As	  a	  belief	  that	  captures	  the	  importance	  of	  caring	  for	  our	  planet,	  or	  that	  generates	  awe	  
that	  our	  wonderful	  and	  intricately	  arranged	  universe	  warrants,	  or	  that	  reminds	  us	  of	  our	  sheer	  
fortuity	  in	  waking	  up	  in	  the	  universe	  at	  all,	  I	  think	  that	  the	  belief	  retains	  some	  truth.	  It	  is	  true	  in	  part,	  
if	  you	  like.	  I	  think	  that	  the	  literal/ideological	  truth	  distinction	  is	  a	  useful	  distinction,	  and	  one	  that	  
reveals	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  New	  Atheists	  are	  largely	  wasting	  their	  breath	  in	  denouncing	  the	  
manifestly	  false	  claims	  made	  by	  the	  supposedly	  foolish	  religious	  believer.	  
I	  now	  want	  to	  consider	  some	  of	  the	  other	  problems	  that	  I	  find	  with	  New	  Atheism.	  Once	  again,	  let	  me	  
stress	  that	  I	  have	  no	  vested	  interest	  in	  undermining	  the	  robustness	  of	  the	  argument	  against	  religion.	  
I	  am	  a	  card-­‐carrying	  secular	  humanist;	  I	  have	  personally	  rejected	  affiliation	  with	  any	  religious	  
institution	  or	  network	  of	  beliefs.	  I	  don’t	  know	  whether	  there	  exists	  a	  god,	  but	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  onus	  
is	  on	  the	  believer	  to	  present	  good	  reasons	  that	  there	  does.	  And	  I	  think	  that	  the	  traditional	  arguments	  
for	  the	  existence	  of	  god,	  especially	  the	  argument	  from	  design,	  are	  persuasive.	  I	  just	  don’t	  think	  that	  
they	  are	  sufficiently	  persuasive	  to	  render	  theism	  the	  most	  rational	  position	  on	  the	  question	  of	  
whether	  a	  god	  exists	  or	  not.	  The	  source	  of	  my	  most	  intense	  frustration	  with	  New	  Atheism	  is	  that	  it	  
assumes	  religious	  claims	  are	  exhausted	  by	  attempts	  to	  factually	  describe	  the	  world	  –	  that	  is,	  New	  
Atheism	  is	  often	  unwittingly	  committed	  to	  what	  I’ve	  termed	  the	  TAO	  view.	  And	  I	  have	  presented	  
reasons	  for	  thinking	  that	  the	  TAO	  view	  is	  false.	  I	  now	  want	  to	  present	  and	  develop	  two	  further	  
objections	  that	  I	  have	  to	  New	  Atheism.	  
How	  to	  lose	  the	  argument	  and	  alienate	  people	  	  
Firstly,	  I	  think	  that	  New	  Atheism	  picks	  the	  low-­‐hanging	  fruit.	  Armed	  with	  the	  TAO	  view	  and	  the	  
scientific	  method,	  it	  subjects	  the	  claims	  of	  religion	  to	  scientific	  scrutiny	  and	  proudly	  exposes	  most,	  or	  
all,	  of	  these	  beliefs	  manifestly	  false.	  Obviously	  water	  doesn’t	  literally	  turn	  into	  wine,	  laughs	  Dawkins!	  
Clearly	  we	  have	  better	  grounds	  to	  believe	  the	  otherwise-­‐uniform	  laws	  of	  nature	  have	  continued	  to	  
apply,	  than	  that	  a	  divinely-­‐orchestrated	  miracle	  has	  occurred.11	  Claims	  of	  the	  scientific	  coherence	  of	  
transubstantiation	  ,	  of	  bodily	  resurrection,	  of	  flying	  horses,	  and	  whatever	  else	  is	  chucked	  into	  the	  
basket	  that	  New	  Atheists	  like	  to	  label	  ‘religious	  orthodoxy’,	  are	  met	  with	  incredulous	  stares	  by	  men	  
in	  white	  lab	  coats	  (and	  they	  are	  almost	  always	  men).	  I	  take	  this	  to	  be	  an	  extension	  of	  my	  original	  
objection	  to	  the	  TAO	  assumption,	  but	  I	  do	  think	  it	  is	  intellectually	  lazy	  to	  dedicate	  hundreds	  of	  pages	  
to	  those	  religious	  beliefs	  that	  are	  in	  an	  important	  sense	  not	  there	  to	  be	  literally	  believed	  in,	  anyway.	  
An	  intellectually	  serious	  Catholic	  might	  well	  reject	  the	  thought	  that	  wine	  literally	  is	  the	  blood	  of	  
Christ,	  but	  they	  can	  just	  as	  well	  scoff	  at	  the	  New	  Atheist’s	  declaration	  that	  this	  revelation	  somehow	  
proves	  religious	  belief	  to	  be	  false.	  What’s	  false	  is	  the	  literal	  truth	  of	  transubstantiation;	  the	  truth	  that	  
transubstantiation	  represents	  –	  that	  there	  is	  value	  in	  rituals	  that	  take	  us	  away	  from	  the	  
commonplace	  and	  direct	  our	  attention	  to	  the	  sacred	  and	  the	  precious	  –	  is,	  quite	  plausibly,	  an	  
important	  truth.	  The	  New	  Atheists’	  mistake,	  then,	  is	  to	  put	  religious	  commitment	  almost	  entirely	  in	  
the	  head,	  when	  much	  of	  it	  belongs	  to	  the	  heart.12	  Once	  you’ve	  shown	  that	  wine	  isn’t	  literally	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  On	  this	  point	  the	  New	  Atheists	  (particularly	  Hitchens)	  like	  to	  appeal	  to:	  D.	  Hume	  Of	  Miracles	  (La	  Salle,	  Illinois:	  
Open	  Court,	  1988),	  p.	  37	  
12	  I	  apologise	  for	  the	  cliché,	  but	  I	  think	  that	  it	  captures	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  ideological	  truths	  of	  religious	  belief	  
resonate	  on	  a	  far	  deeper	  level	  than	  any	  scientific	  repudiation	  of	  a	  given	  dogmatic	  belief	  ever	  could.	  I’m	  
reminded	  of	  the	  Angels	  and	  Demons	  movie	  quote,	  made	  by	  a	  Catholic	  priest	  to	  atheist	  academic	  Robert	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blood	  of	  Christ,	  you	  have	  failed	  to	  address	  any	  of	  the	  fundamental	  human	  anxieties:	  about	  death,	  
loneliness,	  despair,	  and	  ultimate	  meaninglessness.	  
Secondly,	  I	  think	  that	  New	  Atheism’s	  eagerness	  to	  denounce	  the	  religious	  as	  deluded,	  and	  their	  
corresponding	  beliefs	  as	  absurd	  or	  dangerous,	  threatens	  to	  disengage	  a	  whole	  host	  of	  people	  who	  
want	  to	  commit	  to	  precisely	  those	  sorts	  of	  humanitarian	  projects	  and	  moral	  progresses	  that	  the	  New	  
Atheists	  in	  their	  moral	  high-­‐mindedness	  proclaim	  that	  they	  are	  so	  keen	  to	  see.	  As	  I’ve	  argued	  above	  
when	  discussing	  the	  aesthetic	  and	  moral	  interpretations	  of	  religious	  language,	  religious	  commitment	  
provides	  in	  the	  best	  cases	  a	  conceptually	  coherent	  means	  to	  be	  morally	  serious	  and	  to	  escape	  
crippling	  pessimism	  about	  the	  meaning	  of	  one’s	  own	  personal	  existence.	  These	  drives	  –	  the	  first	  
moral,	  the	  second	  approximately	  aesthetic	  –	  are	  the	  sort	  of	  drives	  that	  power	  innovation	  and	  that	  
motivate	  people	  to	  take	  action	  to	  fight	  against	  injustice	  and	  even,	  dare	  I	  say	  it,	  irrationality.	  The	  New	  
Atheist	  dismissal	  of	  religious	  belief	  as	  the	  very	  paradigm	  of	  injustice	  and	  irrationality	  –	  as	  the	  poison	  
that	  pollutes	  our	  innate	  impulse	  towards	  human	  solidarity13	  –	  effectively	  removes	  much	  of	  the	  
enchantment	  and	  wonder	  we	  can	  find	  in	  the	  universe.	  I	  am	  not	  trying	  to	  conclude	  that	  theism	  is	  the	  
only	  set	  of	  beliefs	  that	  can	  generate	  feelings	  of	  awe	  and	  splendour;	  of	  moral	  seriousness	  and	  a	  sense	  
of	  obligation	  to	  make	  the	  world	  a	  better	  place.	  But	  it	  is	  certain	  that	  no	  such	  conclusions	  are	  entailed	  
by	  atheism	  alone.	  The	  conclusion	  that	  there	  does	  not	  exist	  a	  god	  –	  so	  there’s	  no	  transcendent	  law-­‐
giver	  to	  whom	  we	  are	  all	  ultimately	  accountable,	  and	  the	  universe	  was	  not	  designed	  with	  any	  
purpose	  in	  mind	  –	  does	  not	  demand	  that	  we	  seek	  to	  improve	  the	  world	  around	  us	  to	  make	  it	  more	  
joyous,	  more	  beautiful,	  and	  more	  just.	  Atheists	  can	  do	  all	  that,	  but	  not	  solely	  in	  virtue	  of	  their	  beliefs	  
qua	  atheism.	  
I	  am	  not	  saying	  that	  we	  would	  not,	  or	  cannot,	  know	  right	  from	  wrong	  without	  divine	  insight.	  And	  I	  do	  
not	  want	  to	  deny	  that	  for	  many	  people,	  the	  thought	  that	  this	  life	  is	  the	  one	  life	  we	  have	  acts	  as	  a	  
powerful	  springboard	  to	  motivate	  a	  well-­‐lived	  and	  virtuous	  life.	  My	  overarching	  thesis	  is	  as	  follows.	  
We	  do	  not	  have	  many	  systems	  of	  belief	  which	  consider	  seriously	  the	  great	  questions	  of	  how	  we	  got	  
here,	  how	  to	  live	  now	  that	  we	  are	  here,	  and	  where	  we	  are	  going.	  These	  questions	  are	  not	  asked	  in	  
reality	  television;	  they	  aren’t	  addressed	  comprehensively	  in	  any	  political	  mode	  of	  thought.	  In	  a	  world	  
where	  religion	  continues	  to	  inspire	  moral	  action,	  to	  invest	  human	  lives	  with	  meaning,	  and	  on	  a	  good	  
day	  to	  centre	  its	  entire	  raison	  d’être	  on	  forgiveness	  and	  accountability	  for	  one’s	  actions,	  I	  see	  no	  
overarching	  reason	  why	  we	  should	  force	  its	  demise.	  Religion	  might	  well	  die	  out	  in	  a	  few	  centuries.	  I	  
suspect	  it	  will.	  But	  I	  despair	  at	  the	  thought	  of	  there	  being	  nothing	  of	  meaning	  and	  moral	  gravity	  in	  its	  
place.	  	  
Once	  you	  have	  proved	  false	  most	  of	  the	  claims	  made	  by	  religion,	  as	  New	  Atheists	  are	  tremendously	  
shrewd	  and	  well-­‐practiced	  in	  doing,	  the	  hard	  work	  remains	  to	  be	  done.	  The	  challenge	  is	  then	  to	  give	  
people	  a	  substantive,	  affirmative,	  and	  morally	  serious	  outlook	  in	  which	  they	  can	  invest.	  And	  I	  take	  it	  
that	  such	  an	  outlook	  could	  borrow	  hallmark	  virtues	  of	  the	  New	  Atheists	  (on	  a	  good	  day)	  –	  inferring	  
no	  more	  than	  is	  given	  by	  the	  evidence;	  awestruck	  engagement	  with	  the	  natural	  world	  –	  and	  
unashamedly	  throw	  in	  the	  insights	  of	  millennia	  of	  attempts	  to	  understand	  our	  place	  in	  the	  world	  and	  
how	  to	  act	  in	  it	  that	  can	  be	  garnered	  from	  human	  culture.	  And	  one	  of	  the	  greatest	  treasure-­‐troves	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Langdon:	  ‘My	  church	  feeds	  the	  needy	  and	  poor.	  What	  does	  your	  church	  [the	  “church”	  of	  scientific	  scepticism,	  
the	  viewer	  infers]	  do?'	  from	  dir.	  R.	  Howard	  Angels	  and	  Demons	  (Columbia	  Pictures,	  2009)	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  prominent	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  New	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  A.	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  Grayling	  The	  Choice	  Of	  Hercules:	  Pleasure,	  
Duty	  And	  The	  Good	  Life	  In	  The	  21st	  Century (Phoenix,	  2008),	  pp.	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human	  culture	  is	  humanity’s	  collective	  religious	  heritage.	  So	  I	  conclude	  that	  what	  we	  need	  is	  a	  
humanist	  reformation.	  But	  that’s	  to	  take	  us	  further	  afield,	  and	  it’s	  a	  project	  for	  another	  day.	  The	  
more	  pertinent	  moral	  I	  draw	  from	  the	  foregoing	  discussion	  is	  that	  religious	  claims	  aren’t	  all	  
descriptive	  truth-­‐apt	  claims.	  Rather,	  religious	  language	  can	  be	  used	  perfectly	  meaningfully	  and	  
intelligibly,	  even	  though	  it	  is	  not	  always	  in	  the	  business	  of	  purporting	  to	  describe	  the	  world.	  And	  on	  
that	  score,	  at	  least,	  the	  New	  Atheists	  have	  got	  things	  wrong.	  
